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Malicious useCASE STUDY / Reported by CERT-UA and Google

Malware asked AI how to collect documents

CERT-UA found malware in deceptive government emails. It asked AI to generate instructions for collecting documents.

Source: CERT-UA
ACTIVITYJune 2025; Google observation
PUBLICLY DISCLOSEDJul 17, 2025
THE AI’S ROLEAttacker's malware uses AI during execution

Google's November 5 report dates its observation to June. CERT-UA received a report on July 10 and published on July 17, already identifying AI's role. Calendar bounds do not establish the campaign's duration.

THE 10-SECOND TAKEAWAY

Watch what software does, including when AI helps direct its next action.

HOW IT WORKED

Follow the chain.

An explanation, not a technical reproduction.
Claimed ministry
→
Email attachment
→
Recipient
SIMPLIFIED VIEW · 1 / 3
STEP 01

Deliver a deceptive email

A compromised email account sent malware disguised as a ministry attachment.

CERT-UA
Move through the story at your own pace.
1 / 3
THINK OF IT THIS WAY

Editorial analogy: a harmful program has a translator on call. The attacker supplies the request; the translator converts it into instructions the program can use.

An analogy for the mechanism; not an additional claim about the incident.
KEEP THE EVIDENCE IN VIEW

What we know.
What we don’t.

Reported outcomes

Google classifies PROMPTSTEAL, its name for LAMEHUG, as observed in operations. Google Threat Intelligence Group

Important limits

Victim totals and stolen-data volumes are undisclosed.

CERT-UA's APT28 attribution is moderate-confidence.

Independent AI target selection is not established.

WHY IT MATTERS

The lesson beyond
this one case.

Editorial lesson: generated instructions still become actions on a computer. Defenders need visibility into running programs, access to files, and outbound connections, even when the instructions change.

What happened in response? +

CERT-UA published detection indicators. A campaign-wide shutdown is not established. CERT-UA

FROM THE INCIDENT TO THE DEFENSE

What could help
an organization?

Editorial defense mapping: protect the recipient and investigate the program's behavior.

Employees

Control unexpected software

Allow staff to install approved software through trusted channels, review risky attachments, and provide an easy way to report suspicious messages.

What this does—and does not—establish

A familiar sender account can be compromised. Appearance and staff awareness alone cannot establish an attachment's safety.

Security operations

Connect device activity to data movement

Correlate unusual program starts, bulk document access and outbound transfers; give responders a tested way to isolate affected devices.

What this does—and does not—establish

These signals need reliable records and investigation. The reports do not establish the victims' controls or prove that one product would have prevented the campaign.

Editorial connections to relevant controls, not evidence that a particular technology would have prevented this case. Each guide links to the security guidance behind its recommendations.

Explore the full AI security framework
TRACE IT TO THE SOURCE

Read the evidence.

Explore more original accounts in the source report library ↗.

These are source-reported findings. An independent assessment, when available, is labeled explicitly.

01
LAMEHUG attacks against Ukraine's security and defense sectorCERT-UA · Jul 17, 2025 · national incident response investigation
02
GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Advances in Threat Actor Usage of AI ToolsGoogle Threat Intelligence Group · Nov 5, 2025 · primary threat investigation

Read this case’s update history →

Reviewed Sep 12, 2026 · Editorial methodology · Structured data